Abstract-The design of logic controllers for event-driven systems continue to rely largely on intuitive methods rather than on formal techniques. This approach results in a control code that requires extensive verification, is hard to maintain and modify, and may even fail at times. Supervisory control theory (SCT) provides a formal approach to logic control synthesis. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the supervisory control theory in manufacturing systems, an educational test-bed that simulates an automated car assembly line has been built using LEGO r blocks. Finite state machines (FSMs) are used for modeling operations of the assembly line, and for the specifications that accomplish the task of successfully completing the assembly repeatedly. Using the technique of SCT, we derive a supervisor that enforces the specifications while offering the maximum flexibility of assembly. Subsequently a controller is extracted from the maximally permissive supervisor for the purpose of implementing the control by selecting, when possible, only one controllable event from among the ones allowed by the supervisor. Testing to check the correctness of the control code is reduced, since the controller is guaranteed to enforce the specifications.
I. Introduction

S
IGNIFICANT increases in the level of automation [3] and system complexity have necessitated the use of methods which do not rely on informal, intuitive or heuristically designed control programs [6] . Present day controller implementations, even those using specialized logicbased control languages like Grafcet [1] , remain largely based on the expertise and experience of the designer, rather than on formal control design approaches that have been developed for discrete event control in recent years. Supervisory control theory (SCT) proposed by RamadgeWonham [8] is particularly well suited for the task of controller design since the resulting supervisor is always guaranteed to meet the control specifications. This theory is applicable to any system which evolves in response to events that are spontaneous, instantaneous, asynchronous and thus discrete in nature. Such systems are classified as discrete event system (DES) and have been examined in detail [5] , [8] .
A DES to be controlled, also called a plant, is modeled by a FSM and can equivalently be described by a language model. The specifications which express the constraints that one wishes to impose on the plant's behavior are modeled as formal languages as well. A supervisor exercises control over the plant by dynamically disallowing a minimal set of controllable events so as to achieve the desired specifications. Thus the supervisor is designed to be maximally permissive in the supervisory control theory. A controller is extracted out of the supervisor by selecting, when possible, at most one controllable event from among the ones allowed by the supervisor. The steps to be followed for designing control programs using supervisory control theory are:
• FSM models of the system to be controlled.
• FSM models of the safety and progress control specifications of the system.
• Use of supervisory control theory to obtain the maximally permissive supervisor for the system.
• Extraction of a controller from the supervisor, which permits at most one controllable event to be enabled at each state.
• Translation of the controller into control code or PLC.
Some of the advantages of using SCT for automated control synthesis are as follows:
• Any change in the plant or its control specifications can be rapidly captured into models and then translated into executable control code.
• Testing of the control code obtained using SCT is not required since its correctness is guaranteed.
• Expensive mechanical safeguards which are installed in the system can be reduced owing to the fact that unsafe behavior in the system will be avoided by imposition of the safety specifications.
• The FSM models used for modeling the system and the specifications may be reused for other analysis such as failure diagnosis.
• The supervisor provides the maximum permissible ways of achieving the control objective. The designer of the system can choose which particular controller to extract out of the supervisor based on different criteria, such as minimum operation time. At a later time a different controller can be chosen if the design criteria changes.
• Since the control code can be generated automatically the control designer can work at an abstracted level, without being bothered about the manner or language in which the control code implementation will be done.
In this paper we describe a simple educational test-bed r car assembly line. The objective is to demonstrate a formal way of designing a controller for a discrete event plant by applying the theory of supervisory control. This miniature assembly line shown in Figure 5 performs a very simple assembly of the roof and the chassis. The two parts are transported to the press section from their respective initial sections, where a vertical press operation assembles the two parts, and finally the assembled part exits the assembly line through the unloading section. A transporter links the chassis, roof, press, and unloading sections. While setting up the miniature LEGO r factory, the one built at the University of Massachusetts [2] served as a prototype.
We present FSM models of each of the individual sections, the composition of which is the entire plant model. The number of states in transporter, chassis, roof, press, and unloading sections is 21,30, 15, 23, and 8 respectively, which implies a maximum of about 1.7 × 10 6 states for the entire system.
We also provide safety and progress specification models, where safety specification is needed for the safe operation of the system whereas the progress specification is needed to achieve the task of assembly. For the assembly line, the safety specification is a conjunct of sixteen sub-specifications. There is a single progress specification which is obtained by combining four different sub-tasks. The overall specification is the conjunct of the safety and progress.
Using the supervisory control theory we obtain the maximally permissive supervisor for the miniature assembly line that enforces the overall specification. This turns out to be the automaton represented by the overall specification itself, since the overall specification is found to be controllable and relative-closed [5] . A modular approach is taken to verify this so as to cope with the complexity of the system and specification models. We use the discrete-event systems software toolkit, UKDES, developed at the University of Kentucky for the verification of the properties of interest. The software toolkit is available at www.eng.iastate.edu/∼rkumar. A controller is extracted out of the supervisor and it is then automatically translated into the LEGO r Dacta control software code.
II. Notation and Preliminaries
Abstractly, a discrete event system can also be viewed as a state machine, G = (X, Σ, δ, x 0 , X m ), where X is the set of states, Σ is the set of events, δ : X × Σ → X is the partial state transition function, x 0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and X m ⊆ X is the set of marked or final states. Σ * is used to denote the set of all finite length sequences of events from Σ. A trace is an element of Σ * and a language is a subset of Σ * . For a language H, the notation H, called the prefix closure of H, is the set of all prefixes of traces in H. H is said to be prefix closed if H = H. The generated and marked language of G are denoted by L(G) and L m (G) respectively. Synchronous composition of state machines is used to represent the concurrent behavior of two DESs. When systems having the same events set operate the individual behaviors.
The set of plant events is partitioned into two disjoint sets Σ c , the set of all controllable events, and Σ u , the set of all uncontrollable events. A controllable event is one which can be allowed to occur or prevented from possibly occurring by an external agent, whereas no such control is possible for an uncontrollable event. A supervisor determines the set of events to be disabled upon each observed sequence of events. A supervisor, denoted S, is a map S : L(G) → 2 Σ−Σu that determines the set of events S(s) ⊆ (Σ − Σ u ) to be disabled after the occurrence of trace s ∈ L(G). The effect of supervisory control may also be achieved by taking a synchronous composition of plant automaton G and supervisor automaton S. Then the supervised system is represented by the automaton G S. Since S must never prevent any feasible uncontrollable event from happening, the following should hold:
, in which case S is said to be Σ u -enabling [5] . Further, S is said to be non-blocking if L(G S) ⊆ L m (G S), i.e., if each generated trace of the controlled plant can be extended to be a marked trace of the controlled plant.
It is known from supervisory control theory [8] that given a discrete event plant G and a desired nonempty specification language K ⊆ L m (G), there exists a Σ u -enabling and nonblocking supervisor S such that L m (G S) = K if and only if K is controllable and relative-closed with respect to G, i.e,
(In applications where the marking status is determined by the specification, we can let L m (G) := K, in which case the relative-closure property trivially holds.) If K is controllable and relative-closed with respect to L(G) then the generator automata of K can serve as the required supervisor, but if this is not the case, then one computes the supremal controllable and relative-closed sublanguage of K with respect to G [5] .
A controller that we design, further restricts the behavior of the plant with the property that it permits the execution of only one controllable event following each trace, whenever at least one such event is permitted by the supervisor. We extract a controller out of the maximally permissive supervisor by ad-hocly selecting a controllable event from among the ones enabled by the maximally permissive supervisor.
III. Example: Control of a lego r transporter
For the sake of illustration of SCT, we first present a simpler example of a LEGO r transporter system. In subsequent sections, the FSM modeling and supervisory control of the test-bed LEGO r factory are provided. A transporter, shown in Figure 1 , moves between home and extended positions, crossing a number of intermediary positions. An angle sensor, A1, is used to determine when the transporter is either in the extended, f, intermediate, a,g, An automaton model of the system is constructed by considering all possible sequence of events possible in the plant starting from the initial state. We assume that the initial state of the system is when all the actuators are off (Irof, Ifof) and the transporter is in retracted position (l). In the initial state the controllable events Ifon, and Iron, are possible. Ifon will cause the transporter to leave the home position in the forward direction and enter the intermediary position, a. On the other hand, the Iron command will not change the position of the transporter as it already is in the home position. In this way the automaton model is constructed by considering all possibile events, at all the possible states reachable from the initial state. In the FSM models controllable transitions are indicated by a short line drawn across the transitions. Filled circles in the FSM models represent marked or acceptable behavior of the system. The FSM model of the transporter system is shown in Figure 2 . 
A. Specification Models
Safety specifications are concerned with the safe operation of the plant and must be enforced regardless of what task the plant is performing. The progress specification is used to specify the specific task the plant needs to perform. Since the prefixes of safe operations must themselves be safe, safety specifications are prefix closed. In contrast, the progress specifications are non-prefix closed. The safety specifications for the model is shown in Figure 3 , which indicate that when the transporter reaches the extended position the forward motor should no longer be kept on, and similarly when the transporter reaches the home position ification is also shown in Figure 3 , wherein the transporter should commence movement from the home position, travel until the extended position and return to home, whence all movement should be turned off permanently, i.e., the cycle should not be repeated. An overall FSM model of the specifications is first obtained by taking a synchronous composition of the safety and progress specifications, yielding a combined specification having 5 states. For computing a supervisor, we use the DES software toolkit, and this yields a supervisor for the transporter system having 11 states. The supervisor and one of the possible candidate controllers is shown in Figure 4 . Note that at any stage of the assembly process the controller enables at most one controllable event.
B. Supervisor Synthesis and Controller Extraction
IV. Description of LEGO r assembly line
This miniature assembly line simulates the conditions under which actual automobile assembly take place, and involves: motors which drive mechanisms which in turn cause to move the semi-finished product through various stages of the assembly; and sensors which bring back the status of the present plant conditions to the LEGO r Dacta controller. There are a total of 8 sensors (touch, light, and angle) and 8 actuators (motors). The factory layout is given in Figure 5 . The factory is controlled by one personal computer, which is interfaced with the assembly-line through a LEGO r Control Lab Interface Box. This interface box has 8 sensor inputs, four of which accommodate passive sensors viz. touch; while the other four accommodate active sensors viz. light or angle. Touch sensors return a boolean value when depressed. Light sensors return the light intensity reflected into the sensor's detector, either as a percentage or as a raw number. Angle sensors which are always connected to a rotating axle, report either the angle in degrees or the number of revolutions turned. In addition to sensor inputs, the interface box also provides eight motor outputs. The controller code is written using the Control Lab software which is written in a special version of the "Logo" programming language.
V. Plant models
The plant is modeled using deterministic FSM models. Each state in the plant is considered marked, since the true marking is imposed by the progress specification (described in Section VI). Instead of having a single incomprehensible model for the system, and to make the modeling simpler, we develop smaller sized "sub-models" by partitioning the entire system into five sections, namely, transporter, chassis, roof, press, and unloading. 1. Transporter Parts are transported from one assembly section to another via the transporter, which consists of a fixture that is connected to one end of a rack that is moved by a pinion powered from a gear box motor. An angle sensor mounted on the same shaft as that of the pinion, counts off the number of rotations of the axle through it, in order to determine the position of the fixture. The FSM model of the transporter consists of 21 states. The FSM Press The pressing of the roof and the chassis is done by releasing a heavy LEGO r block onto a properly positioned transporter carrying the roof-chassis combination. The mechanism is controlled by a press pusher and winding motor. Initially the pusher is advanced so that the weighted block is suspended at a certain height. When the pusher retracts the weight descends and presses the pieces together. After this the pusher is advanced again so as to mesh with the winding motor gears, which when switched on raises the block up again. The retracted position of the pusher and the raised position of the block are monitored by sensors. The FSM model of the press section operations consists of 23 states. 5. Unloading The unloading conveyor conveys parts that are pushed onto it by the unloading pusher. There is a sensor for monitoring the retracted position of the pusher. The FSM model of the unloading section consists of 8 states. Figure 7 lists all the events of the plant and Figure 8 shows the FSM models of the chassis, roof, press and unloading sections of the plant.
VI. Safety and Progress specifications
There are a total of sixteen safety specifications for the LEGO r plant. The press pusher M6 should not move back if the transporter is not under the press section A5 = 21. 6. Global safety specification 6, K6a, K6b: The transporter M1 should not move unless the retracted signals from the chassis pusher T2 and the unload pusher L8 are received. 7. Local safety specification 1, K7: This pertains to the chassis section. If the chassis pusher T2 is not retracted, the chassis conveyor M2 cannot be switched on, and the chassis pusher M3 be prevented from turning off. 8. Local safety specification 2, K8: This pertains to the chassis section. If the chassis pusher motor M3 is on, the chassis conveyor M2 may not be switched on and vice versa. chassis conveyor M4 cannot be switched on, and the roof pusher M5 be prevented from turning off. 11. Local safety specification 5, K11: This pertains to the roof section. If the roof pusher motor M5 is on, the roof conveyor M4 may not be switched on and vice versa. 12. Local safety specification 6, K12: This pertains to the roof section. If there is a part on the roof dockL7, then the roof conveyor M4 should be switched off. On the other hand when there is no part on the dock then the chassis pusher M5 should not be switched on. 13. Local safety specification 7, K13: This pertains to the press section. If the press pusher motor M6 is on in either direction, the press winding motor M7 may not be switched on and vice versa. 14. Local safety specification 8, K14: This pertains to the press section. The winding motor M7 should be stopped if the press up signal T4 exists. 15. Local safety specification 9, K15: This pertains to the transporter. Backward motion of the referenced trans- The progress specification is specific to a particular product being assembled, and essentially requires a certain order of output (sensor) events to be tracked. For the present example this governs the way in which the assembly of the automobile is done in the plant, and is shown in Figure 10 . The overall task is broken down into the cyclic execution of the four subtasks:
1. Sub-task 1: Move the transporter to the chassis section and start chassis operations: Wait for the transporter to reach the chassis section when A5 records a value of 80 rotations (f), then wait until light sensor L6 turns on (dCup) indicating that a chassis piece is on the dock, and finally wait until when sensor T2 turns on (pCup), indicating chas-2. Sub-task 2: Move the transporter to the roof section and start roof operations: These are similar to sub-task ST1, at the chassis section. 3. Sub-task 3: Perform the following sequence of operations: Wait for the transporter to reach the press section (j), then wait for sensor T1 to be turn on (pPup), and finally wait for T4 to turn on, indicating that the press is raised (wPup). 4. Sub-task 4: Move the transporter to the unloading section and start unloading operations. The unloading section needs to perform the following sequence of operations: Wait for the transporter to reach the unloading section (l), then wait until light sensor L8 turn on (pUup), indicating that the unloading pusher is retracted. Refer to the procedure followed in the assembly line under this progress specification. The progress specification has only one state marked, the initial one, indicating that the final and initial positions are the same and that the cycle can repeat indefinitely.
VII. Supervisor Synthesis and Controller Extraction
A synchronous composition of plant section models may be taken yielding a single model of the plant with a state space of size around 1.7 × 10 6 . Similarly we may obtain a single specification model of a comparable size, and perform the controllability and relative-closure checks. Checking controllability and relative-closure of a such a large specification model against such a large plant model is not practical, and hence we proceed by applying a modular approach [9] . Under this approach, given two controllable and relative-closed specifications, H 1 and H 2 , their conjunct is also controllable and relative-closed whenever they are non-conflicting, i.e., H 1 ∩ H 2 ⊆ H 1 ∩ H 2 . Note that this property always holds when H 1 and H 2 are prefix-closed languages, i.e., safety specifications.
In order to manage the computational complexity, we use the following modular approach to verify the controllability and relative-closure of the conjunct of all safety (K1 − K16) and progress (K17) specifications. Instead of obtaining a combined safety specification of the plant and then verifying its controllability, it is easier to we verify the controllability of individual safety specifications against local safety specification K7 concerns the operation of the chassis section. So we verify its controllability against the model of the chassis section only, which as shown in Figure 8 has 30 states. Since K7 has 2 states, the complexity of this verification is O(60). Proceeding in a similar fashion the controllability of other local safety specifications is verified. Next, for each global safety specification which involves more than one section, we use the synchronous composition of the FSM models of the relevant sections as the plant model and perform the controllability test. For example, the plant model for the sixth global safety specification K6 comprises of the synchronous composition of the FSM models of the chassis, the transporter, and the unloading sections. Finally, since the individual safety specifications are controllable and prefix-closed we conclude that their intersection is also controllable and prefix-closed.
It remains to verify the controllability and relativeclosure of the progress specification K17, and its nonconflictingness with respect to the intersection of all the safety specifications K := ∩ 16 i=1 Ki. Since the plant marking is determined solely by the progress specification,
i.e., K17 is relative-closed. We establish the controllability of K17 by viewing it as a cyclical concatenation of the four sub-tasks. The first sub-task starts in the initial state of the plant and upon completion sends the plant to a final state, which can be treated as the initial state of the second subtask. We verify the controllability of each of the subtasks against the relevant portion of the plant which is appropriately initialized and terminated. This lets us perform the controllability test of the progress specification modularly, where modularity stems from the sequential (as opposed to parallel) decomposition of the progress specification.
Next we establish that the intersection of the safety specifications K := ∩ 16 i=1 Ki and the progress specification K17 is non-conflicting. We observe that the progress specification never violates any of the safety, i.e., K17 ⊆ K = K, which also implies K17 ⊆ K = K. These automatically give us the non-conflictingness property since,
Finally we are interested in obtaining a controller for the supervised plant. One particular controller candidate, having 49 states, is shown in Figure 11 . It is obtained by selecting at most one controllable event, when possible, from among the ones allowed by the maximally permissive supervisor. The controller chosen for implementation is translated into LEGO r commands in a direct way, as there exists a one-to-one correspondence between controller events and the actuator commands to be executed or the sensor inputs to be monitored.
VIII. Conclusion
Implementation of the supervisory control theory has A controller may be extrated from a maximally permissive supervisor either ad-hocly, or if need be, more systematically using optimal control. Choice of which controllable event to enable, when several candidates exist is designers' preference, since any event enabled by the supervisor is guaranteed to meet the control specification. For systematic extration of controllers, optimal control policies can be implemented (see [7] ).
In order to control failure-prone systems additional behavior indicating failure conditions have to be modeled (see [4] ). As an example, consider the transporter system prone to sensor failure of signal f , which causes it to occasionally get stuck in the up position. To model this, one introduces a fault event f supF , and a corresponding recovery event, f supR. Once the non-faulty model has been appropriately augmented to include the faulty behavior, the supervisory control theory can be employed in a manner similar to that for the non-faulty systems.
